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Abstract
There is a growing interest in prevention in several policy areas and this provides a
strong motivation for an improved integration of forecasting with machine learning into
models of decision making. In this article we propose a framework to tackle conflict pre-
vention. A key problem of conflict forecasting for prevention is that predicting the start of
conflict in previously peaceful countries needs to overcome a low baseline risk. To make
progress in this hard problem this project combines a newspaper-text corpus of more than
4 million articles with unsupervised and supervised machine learning. The output of the
forecast model is then integrated into a simple static framework in which a decision maker
decides on the optimal number of interventions to minimize the total cost of conflict and
intervention. This exercise highlights the potential cost savings of prevention for which
reliable forecasts are a prerequisite.
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1 Introduction
Civil wars are a serious humanitarian and economic problem. According to data from the
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in 2019 at least 79.5 million people around the
world have been forced to flee their homes, the large majority by armed conflict. Once started,
a small armed conflict can quickly escalate and lead to repeated cycles of violence that have
the potential to ruin society for a generation. International organizations like the UN, the World
Bank, the IMF and the OECD have therefore all identified fragility as a key factor for long-term
development. Most recently, this has led to calls for more resources and institutional reforms
aimed at preventing civil wars (United Nations and World Bank 2017 and OECD 2018). Most
explicitly this general trend was expressed by the former President of the World Bank Jim Yong
Kim (World Bank 2017b): “[...], we need to do more early on to ensure that development
programs and policies are focused on successful prevention.”
However, developing an optimal policy for such a prevention problem is difficult because it
requires the policymaker to take actions in the present directed at preventing an uncertain future
outcome. Be it economic crisis, climate change, armed conflict, crime or an epidemic; what we
require is not only knowledge about the causal impact of a policy given a state of the world but
also the best possible prediction of this state of the world (Kleinberg et al. 2015). The ques-
tion of whether prevention is economically viable is then not only a question of how effective
interventions are but how well they can be targeted. In other words, we need to combine an
understanding of causal factors with good predictions of what will happen. If it is impossible to
predict where conflict will break out then costly policies aiming at prevention would need to be
implemented very broadly - perhaps making them inefficient. The conflict prevention problem
therefore raises two questions: What is the precision that can be reached in a cross-country
ranking out-of-sample, i.e. without knowing the future? Is this precision high enough to make
prevention economically viable?
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This article aims to contribute to the conflict prevention problem in two ways. First, we
provide a forecast directly targeted at the idea of preventing conflict before it breaks out. Our
forecast uses data on conflict histories together with a corpus of over 4 million newspaper
articles in a combination of unsupervised and supervised machine learning to predict conflict
at the monthly level in over 190 countries. Text has the huge advantage of being updated daily
and can therefore be used to implement an early warning system.1
Second, we introduce a conceptual framework that allows for the integration of knowledge
on the effectiveness and costs of preventive actions with knowledge on the precision of the
forecast. Our framework builds on the standard classification toolbox in machine learning. In
this framework instances are ranked and interventions are targeted at the cases with the highest
risk. We use this framework to show that a key trade off is between the effectiveness of the
policy and the precision of the forecast, and that a key margin of adjustment in prevention is the
risk cutoff at which policymakers would intervene. Low average policy effectiveness and low
average precision both lead to less interventions and a focus on few cases in which the forecast
indicates the highest risk.
A crucial problem for prevention is often that it faces a low baseline risk, i.e. heavily im-
balanced classes. In conflict prevention the problem is particularly severe as policymakers face
the so-called conflict trap which is well-known in the conflict literature (Collier and Sambanis
2002). Countries get stuck in repeated cycles of violence and, as a consequence, conflict history
is an extremely powerful predictor of risk. But if we want to prevent countries from falling into
the conflict-trap we need to pay more attention to previously peaceful countries, which means
we need to predict cases with a baseline risk of below 1%.
We call this the hard problem of conflict prediction, outbreaks of violence in countries with-
out a recent history of violence. Other forecasting studies have encountered the same problem.
In their detailed study of two countries Bazzi et al. (2019) conclude, for example, that "Even
1To illustrate this we will provide such a forecast publicly starting in early 2021 on the webpage www.
conflictforecast.org.
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with such unusually rich data, however, the models poorly predict new outbreaks or escalations
of violence." Whereas the conflict trap is well-known in the literature this has not led to a sepa-
rate study of hard problem cases and so we do not know whether existing empirical findings are
determined by the majority of cases in which conflict simply followed, spatially or temporally, a
previous conflict. This is exactly where we break ground by studying the role played by conflict
history in 190 countries explicitly and by exploiting news text to go beyond it.
We train and test a prediction model in sequential non-overlapping samples which allows
us to evaluate the out-of-sample performance and at the same time mimics the problem that
policymakers face. We find that a combination of conflict history, text and random forest models
are able to forecast hard problem cases.2 We show that the tree structure allows the model
to adapt to the hard problem by placing indicators of conflict history high up in the tree and
exploiting news text increasingly at the bottom nodes. We find that topics which are not directly
related to violence and negatively associated with risk, such as trade, international relations,
business or economics, are increasingly featured in lower branches of the tree.
To evaluate our forecast we provide an intervention framework which is explicitly based
on the idea of a policymaker who minimizes total costs of conflict. However, as opposed to
Kleinberg et al. (2015), we approach the prediction policy problem within a machine learning
classification framework which allows us to give different cost weights to false positives (high
risk that never escalates into conflict) and false negatives (conflict outbreaks that were not an-
ticipated) and derive optimal forecasts based on these cost weights. This is relevant far beyond
the field of conflict research and in applications outside economics where the policymaker faces
runaway dynamics as in financial crisis, climate change, crime, or epidemics.3 The integration
into a forecast framework allows us to study the trade-offs between forecast precision, the cost
and effectiveness of interventions and the cost of failing to prevent. If conflict is regarded as
2Other prediction methods, such as logit lasso or adaptive boosting, also perform well when combining history
and text. We refer to Appendix E for an extensive comparison.
3See Svensson (2017) for similar arguments in a more standard macro framework.
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more costly, for example, then more situations should be classified as positives and there should
be more interventions. As a result, the forecast will become less conservative. If forecasting a
conflict is difficult or interventions are ineffective then the optimal forecast framework should
produce more negatives so that interventions become less common.
There is a long history in prediction in economics, and for macroeconomic variables like
inflation or economic growth it has long been a goal of academic research. But it is also becom-
ing more common for other outcomes as well.4 However, for conflict the economics literature
has mostly focused on understanding causal mechanisms.5 As a consequence, the literature has
made huge strides in understanding the causes of conflict.6 However, these efforts are often not
effective for forecasting as variables identified to be causal do not have to be, and typically are
not, good predictors of conflict. 7 We illustrate this here by showing that variation in commod-
ity prices of 60 commodities and their export weights are not able to provide a good forecast
for conflict outbreaks despite the fact that they are central to recent causal work on the drivers
of conflict.
Most recently, the conflict literature is moving towards formulating policy recommendations
for the prevention of conflict and contemplating the effectiveness of potential interventions.8 It
is in this context that the prediction part of the prevention problem becomes a crucial ingre-
dient, and our main contribution lies in providing a framework that is maximizing predictive
power. However, we also contribute by providing a first, simple framework that allows both the
4For an overview over the more classic literature see Timmermann (2006) and Elliott and Timmermann (2008,
2013). For recent efforts see Böhme, Gröger and Stöhr (forthcoming), Giglio, Kelly and Pruitt (2016), Costinot,
Donaldson and Smith (2016). For an overview over prediction efforts and methodology see Mullainathan and
Spiess (2017) and Athey and Imbens (2019). In other applications, machine-learning predictions are used to
measure rather than forecast outcomes, such as poverty (Jean et al. 2016; Blumenstock, Cadamuro and On 2015).
5Two exceptions are Celiku and Kraay (2017) and Bazzi et al. (2019). For summaries of the political science
literature see Hegre et al. (2017).
6For an overview of the earlier literature see Blattman and Miguel (2010). For recent contributions in economics
see Besley and Persson (2011); Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012); Dube and Vargas (2013); Bazzi and Blattman
(2014); Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015); Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016); Berman et al. (2017).
7See, for example, Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010; Mueller and Rauh 2018.
8See Blattman and Annan (2015); Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015); Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan
(2017); Meirowitz et al. (2019); Rohner and Thoenig (2020).
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treatment effect size and forecast precision to be traded off against each other. We illustrate this
by showing how a fall in the effectiveness of interventions would affect the optimal use of the
forecasts.
An additional benefit of the forecasts we provide is that they provide both measures of risk
and measures of forecast errors. In other areas of economics this has already produced important
insights.9 In our application, the side-product of the forecast is a monthly conflict risk measure
for nearly 200 countries for the period 2005m1 to 2020m8.10 The fact that our model produces
useful forecasts for low baseline risks means we are able to provide political risk estimates
for all these countries. Apart from guiding better models of decision-making under risk and
uncertainty, this output of the forecasting framework could also provide propensity scores for
cross-country comparisons or could provide useful data on unforeseen outbreaks of conflict or
help study the role of stabilizing factors.
There is a growing interest in the use of text to generate data, i.e. feature extraction.11
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) and Ahir, Bloom and Furceri (2018) use relative frequencies
of predetermined keywords positively related to economic uncertainty in order to provide a
measure uncertainty for the US and 143 countries, respectively.12 For our feature extraction we
rely on the full text but reduce the dimensionality through the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
or topic model (Blei, Ng and Jordan 2003). Topic models provide an extremely useful way to
analyze text because they do not rely on strong priors regarding which part of the text will be
useful. In addition, the LDA is in itself a reasonable statistical model of writing and we show
that it is able to reveal useful latent semantic structure in our newstext corpus.13 We find both
positive and negative relationships with conflict risk in the topics. And, perhaps surprisingly,
9Take, for example, Blanchard and Leigh (2013), Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), Rossi and Sekhposyan
(2015) and Tanaka et al. (2019).
10In Appendix E we show that performance stays very similar when predicting conflict outbreaks within larger
time horizons, within 3 and 12 months, or larger outbreaks of at last 50 fatalities.
11See Gentzkow, Kelly and Taddy (2019) for an overview.
12In a similar fashion Baker et al. (2019) capture equity market volatility.
13This feature mirrors findings in Rauh (2019) and Larsen and Thorsrud (2019) who forecast economic activity,
and Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2017) who study the effect of increased transparency on debate in central banks.
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predictive power is also derived from topics reducing their share before conflict breaks out.
Our goal is to maximize forecasting performance and so we cross-validate the model to find
the optimal depth and number of trees in the random forest model, i.e. we regularize the model
conservatively out-of-sample.14 Regularization is necessary due to the so-called “small n large
p" problem we face when forecasting macro events like conflict. The number of cases is limited
and so the forecasting problem cannot be simply solved through a sophisticated supervised
machine learning model with unstructured text. A way forward in these situations is to use
theory to build priors regarding the variables and model to use. An alternative, which we follow
here, is to use unsupervised learning for dimensionality reduction. This method has a long
tradition in macroeconomics (Stock and Watson 2006) but also outside the social sciences, in
particular in application with few positive events to train the model such as medicine (Mwangi,
Tian and Soares 2014). Our results suggest that unsupervised learning can give context to even
the most dramatic changes in news reporting and make the forecast more robust in this way.
In summary, this project advances on several fronts beyond existing work.15 First, we use a
new full-text archive of more than 4 million newspaper articles dense enough to summarize top-
ics at the monthly level for 190 countries. This, in turn, allows us to combine feature extraction
using unsupervised learning with supervised machine learning at the country level. Second,
we explicitly take conflict history into account when analyzing the ability of text to forecast
conflict. This treatment of history allows us to focus on cases without a violent past. Third, we
propose a framework to evaluate optimal intervention policies which is based on the forecast-
ing data. Finally, we rely on innovations in the estimation of the topic model (Blei and Lafferty
2006) to solve the computational challenges implied by the need to re-estimate the topics from
millions of articles for every month in our test sample. This makes our method particularly
14Systematic regularization is still not common practice even in research which clearly aims to provide predic-
tions.
15Including our previous work in Mueller and Rauh (2018) in which we capture conflict history through fixed
effects instead of a dynamic model, use linear regressions instead of random forests, rely on (only) 700,000 news-
paper articles to predict conflicts with at least 25 fatalities at calendar-year intervals, exploit current news only and
do not propose a optimal intervention framework.
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useful for actual policy applications that rely on timely risk updates using vast amounts of text.
In what follows we first explain the importance of the so-called conflict trap for conflict
forecasting. We also show that countries seem to transition in an out of the trap so that treating
it as a characteristic of the country which is fixed is not doing justice to the dynamic nature
of the trap. We then present our forecasting model and the way we evaluate our forecasts in a
rolling out-of-sample test. In Section 4 we present the results of our prediction exercise. Finally,
in section Section 5 we integrate this forecast into a cost-minimization problem and present case
studies of our risk measure before we conclude.
2 The Hard Problem of Conflict Prediction
The most encompassing conflict data is provided by the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
(Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017). We include all battle-related deaths
in this dataset and collapse the micro data at the country/month level. We focus on the monthly
level to have more cases to train but it is straightforward to provide forecasts at any larger
time-horizon, for example, a year ahead.
The data offers three types of conflict fatalities which we all add into a single number.
This implies that we mix terror attacks and more standard, two-sided violence. An important
question arises due to the fact that zeros are not coded in the data. We allocate a zero to all
country/months in which the country was independent and where data from GED is available.
We use the simplest possible definition of conflict - the presence or absence of any fatality
related to armed conflict.16 Importantly, we only consider onset, i.e. only the month before
conflict breaks out. Subsequent months of ongoing conflict are set to missing. This is important
as predicting outbreaks is much harder than predicting conflict. In our data we have 2112 onsets
16In the Appendix we also look at predictive performance when predicting an armed conflict with at least 50
fatalities per month. Here we add the current number of fatalities as a predictor as low levels of violence are a
strong indicator of an eminent outbreak.
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of conflict according to this definition.
The hard problem can be understood through a simple figure which illustrates the extremely
high risk of onset post-conflict and the low-basline risk otherwise. In Figure 1 we plot the
likelihood in our sample that a conflict breaks out for the months after the end of the previous
conflict episode. This shows that the risk of a renewed onset of conflict is close to 40% right
after conflict. Conflict risk falls continuously thereafter but remains substantial in the years
following conflict. Almost 90% of all conflict onsets happen within two years of the previous
conflict. This is what the conflict literature has dubbed the conflict trap. Countries get caught in
cycles of repeating violence. Beyond the first 10 years after conflict, the risk of conflict is very
low. After two years, the baseline risk of conflict outbreaks is 0.5% and outside the ten year
period the baseline risk of conflict onsets is only around 0.2%. However, most countries are
at peace for long periods and many outbreaks therefore take place long after conflict subsided
even if the baseline risk is extremely small.
9
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Note: Figure shows the sample likelihood of conflict relapse after violence ended (at 0) conditional on remaining
in peace. Any violence is a month with any fatalities. THe dashed line is the 95% confidence interval.
In summary, inside the conflict trap onset is relatively likely and easy to forecast using
conflict history. Outside the trap, onset is very unlikely and hard to forecast. Providing risk
estimates for countries that are coming out of conflict therefore provides little added value
beyond what most policymakers would already understand intuitively. Good predictions are
then particularly hard but also particularly useful outside the conflict trap. In our analysis of
forecasts we will take an extreme view and try to forecast conflict for cases outside the ten year
period. We call this the hard problem. We explicitly evaluate the forecast performance of our
model for these cases.
Of course, it might be tempting to instead focus on cases that are easier to predict - and
indeed this is what the current system of peacekeeping is geared to do. But the dynamics of the
conflict trap imply that avoiding destabilization will have huge benefits in the long run. When
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a country experiences an outbreak of violence in a hard-to-predict scenario it is in danger of
falling into a conflict trap. Prevention efforts in hard problem cases which manage to stabilize
countries will therefore have considerable dynamic payoffs. Of course, these efforts need to
be based on an understanding of the causal mechanisms behind conflict to actually change the
trajectory of a country.17
We take an extreme stance here by focusing on the tail risks in countries that did not expe-
rience a conflict in the previous ten years. If these cases can be predicted sufficiently well to
prevent them it will be even easier to predict conflict in cases with a more recent conflict history.
3 Forecast and Test Methodology
We propose the use of machine learning in two steps to bring large quantities of news text to
forecasting conflict and test out-of-sample performance. We first use a dynamic topic model
(Blei and Lafferty 2006), which is an unsupervised method for feature extraction. The ad-
vantage of this method is that it allows us to reduce the dimensionality of text from counts over
several hundred thousand terms to a handful of topics without taking a decision regarding which
part of the text is most useful for forecasting conflict.
3.1 Text Data
As a basis of our method we use a new unique corpus of over 4 million documents from three
newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post and the Economist) and two news aggregators
(BBC Monitor and LatinNews). All sources except for LatinNews are downloaded from Lexis-
Nexis. A text is downloaded if a country or capital name appears in the title or lead paragraph.
17As the quote from the introduction makes clear, prevention is also of interest for the international community.
All big international organisations treat fragility and conflict risk as key problems. The need to forecast hard cases
follows directly from the need to “do more early on”. Once conflict has broken out, prevention has failed and
so, by definition, conflict prevention requires a risk evaluation for hard problem cases, i.e. cases without a recent
conflict history.
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The resulting data is described in detail in Appendix A. Using the dynamic topic model we
derive topic models with K = 7, 15 and 30 topics.18 The reason we choose relatively few topics
is to avoid topics adapting to particularly newsworthy cases of conflict, regions or countries.
The topic models we estimate tend to contain topics that can be attributed to generic content
like politics or economics. A detailed discussion of topics and case studies are presented in
Appendix B.
Figure 2 shows word clouds for six out of 30 topics estimated on the 2020m8 sample de-
picting the most likely terms proportional to their importance in size. The topic model does not
label these probability distributions but, as the topic model is based on a reasonable model of
writing it uncovers distributions which are easy to interpret or at least distinguish. This is a real
strength of using a (statistical) model of writing to extract features from text.
The first topic in Panel a) is what we describe as the terror topic. It features terms such
as “ kill” ,“terrorist” , and “explos” prominently. Panel b) displays a topic which features
mostly terms related to the military such as “troop”, “armi”, and “deploy”. Panel c) features
expressions related to politics such as “elect”, “opposit”, and “vote”, while d) appears to reflect
economic activity, with terms such as “ economi”, “worker” and “price” being keywords. In
Panel e) we see tokens such as “agreement” , “export” , and “tariff” (trade), while Panel f)
exhibits “industri” , “product” , and “market” (industry).
18We need to re-estimate the topic model every month so that it takes around two weeks to estimate all vintages
of the 30 topics model.
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Note: The word clouds represent the most likely terms of 6 out of 30 topics estimated using all text until 2020m8.
The size of a token is proportional to the importance of the token within the topic. The location conveys no
information. Panel a) we consider the Terror topic, b) Military, c) Politics, d) Economics , e) Trade, and f)
Industry.
3.2 Prediction Method
With the estimated topic model we then calculate the share of topics for all countries in each
month between 1989m1 and T . We then use these shares, together with a set of dummies which
capture the post-conflict risk, in a random forest model to forecast conflict out of sample. In
this step we take the perspective of a policymaker who observes all available text and conflict
until period T and has to make a forecast for period T + 1. We summarize the K topic shares
and the log of the word count in the vector, θ it . We then train a forecasting model with all data
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available in T using the model
yit+1 = FT (hit ,θ it) (1)
where yit+1 is the onset of conflict in month t + 1, hit is a vector of three variables capturing
post-conflict dynamics.
The role of machine learning in this step is to build a highly non-linear model FT (hit ,θ it)
and at the same time to discipline the regularization of this model. We fix the hyperparameters
in the first sample (1989m1-2005m1) through cross-validation. The newest conflicts that break
out in the training sample are those that break out in T . Note that this implies that, during
training, we only use data for hit and θ it available until T −1.
With the resulting model we then produce predicted out of sample values
ŷiT+1 = FT (hiT ,θ iT ).
which we compare to the true values yiT+1. We then update our topic model with the news
written in the next month, add the new information on conflicts, retrain the prediction model,
and predict the probabilities of outbreaks in the following month. For testing, we thereby pro-
duce sequential out-of-sample forecasts, ŷiT+1, for T + 1 = 2005m2,2005m3, ...,2020m8. We
then compare these forecasts with the actual realizations yiT+1. In this way we get a realistic
evaluation of what is possible in terms of forecasting power in actual applications as we never
use any data for testing which has been used for training purposes.
To generate FT (.) we tested predictions from k-nearest neighbor, adaptive boosting, ran-
dom forests, neural network, logit lasso regression, and ensembles of all previously mentioned
models. The hyperparameters are chosen by maximizing the AUC through cross-validation
within the sample up to 2005m1. We found that the random forest model provides the best
forecast overall. This is important as it indicates that a method with built-in safeguards against
overfitting performs best in our out-of-sample test.
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4 Forecast Results
4.1 Prediction of Conflict Outbreaks in Hard Cases
In order to understand the performance of forecasting results we need to compare the continuous
forecast values, ŷiT+1 to the actual discrete realizations yiT+1. In the forecasting literature this
is done by picking a cutoff c and discretize using the condition
ŷiT+1 > c.
An increase of the cutoff c increases the number of predicted 0s (negatives) which means
that there are more false negatives (not predicted outbreaks) and true negatives (peace without
warnings). A lower cutoff c increases the number of 1s (positives) which means that there are
more false positives (false alarms) and more true positives (correctly predicted outbreaks). We
will show that the optimal choice of the cutoff c with explicity cost-weights on these different
outcomes can provide interesting insights into the distribution of ŷiT+1. But for now we stick to
standard ways of displaying the trade-off between false positives and false negatives.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are one way to display this trade-off. On the




which is the share of all actual positives that are detected by the classifier. More false negatives
will lower the TPR so that a TPR of 1 is the best possible value. On the x-axis ROC curves




which is the share of all actual negatives that are detected wrongly by the classifier. More false
positives will increase the FPR and the best possible FPR is therefore 0.
A high cutoff c represents a very conservative forecast which warns only of few onsets, tends
to get these cases right (low FPR) but misses a lot of actual onsets (low TPR). Lowering the
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cutoff c will typically increase both the FPR and the TPR. If the TPR increases by more than the
FPR with falling c the ROC rises above the 45 degree line which indicates a better-than-random
forecast.
The ROC curve expresses the possibility frontier of the forecasting model. The area under
the curve (AUC) of the ROC curve is therefore often used to evaluate forecasting models. This
makes sense in settings when the relative costs of false negatives and false positives is not
known. We will stick to the AUC as our performance measure for now. However, the ROC
curve is not sufficient to solve the prevention policy problem. A policymaker who is very afraid
of not being able to intervene before conflicts, for example, will put a high cost to false negatives
which is not reflected in the ROC curve. In Section 5 we therefore turn to a much more specific
interpretation of the policy task.
Figure 3 shows ROC curves for conflict for the entire pool of out-of-sample predictions.
In each panel, we show the forecasting performance of three forecasting models: (i) A model
using just topics and word counts as predictors, which is labeled as text, (ii) a model using only
information about previous violence, which is labeled as history, and (iii) a model that draws
from both text & history.
The text model includes the number of tokens as well as 30 topic shares and stocks. Stocks
are computed as the discounted sum of topic shares of previous months, with an (arbitrarily)
chosen discount factor of 0.8. The idea is that not only immediate events might be of impor-
tance, but also the tendencies a country has been experiencing over the past months. Our history
model consists of three counts of the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities.
The random forest uses these variables repeatedly to generate a non-linear approximation of the
risk as it is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 3: ROC curves of forecasting any violence for all cases (left) and hard cases (right)




















Text & history 0.92 [0.91,0.93]











Text & history 0.79 [0.71,0.86]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token counts
and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict
month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. Left and right panels show
alternative evaluations of the same forecasting model. The left ROC curves show all cases. Hard cases are shown
to the right. Hard cases are defined as not suffering fatalities in 10 years. The numbers in the legends represent
the respective area under curve (AUC) with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
On the left of Figure 3 we see the overall performance of all three sets of predictors when
forecasting conflict. Text alone (green dotted line) provides some forecasting power and this
forecast is comparable to what is common in the literature when predicting at the monthly level
- an AUC of 0.84. But it is clear that the information on conflict history (orange dashed line),
a non-linear model based on only three variables, dominates the text forecast. The model using
text & history also reaches an AUC of 0.92 which is not significantly better than the forecast
from history alone. We generated bootstrapped confidence intervals for the AUC but, even at
the lower bound of these confidence intervals, the AUCs of the combined model is relatively
high.
On the right panel of Figure 3 we evaluate our forecasting models on the hard problem cases,
i.e. when a country has not experienced a battle death for at least 10 years. Here we use the
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same predicted values from our model but only evaluate its performance on the cases without
a conflict history. It is important to note that this is information that a policymaker would
have and would therefore be able to condition on when evaluating a prediction. The conflict
information model (orange dashed line) is now much less able to provide a useful forecast, i.e.
it is not significantly better than random. Text, however, still provides useful forecasting power
and the AUC of 0.79 of the combined model (blue solid line) now comes entirely from the text.
The ability of text features to provide a forecast in cases which experienced no violence for at
least a decade is remarkable as these include instabilities like the beginning of terror campaigns,
insurgencies or revolutions.
The combined model, text & history, is made a lot more robust by the newspaper text. As
the baseline risk from a recent conflict fades, the role of text becomes more and more important.
In Figure 4 we show how the AUCs of our three models behave with fading information from
past conflict. When evaluated from all observations, the conflict history model dominates the
text model and it appears as if the combined model is drawing all its strength from the conflict
history. Performance of all models decreases as we evaluate on cases with less and less recent
conflict. However, the performance of the history model drops most dramatically as the memory
of conflict fades whereas the performance of the text model falls more slowly and stabilizes for
cases without a recent conflict history. Strikingly, for onsets that occur more than 30 months
after the previous conflict, the text-only model provides a better forecast than conflict history.
Accordingly, the combined model is (blue line) able to forecast hard problem cases.
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Note: Figure shows the AUC for onsets that happened in the aftermath of a previous conflict episode. Onsets that
occur within a window of months displayed on the x-axis are excluded in the evaluation. At a value of 20, for
example, all outbreaks are excluded that occur within 20 months of the previous conflict episode. The prediction
method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token counts and ‘history’
contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict month with at least
50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. Left and right panels show alternative
evaluations of the same forecasting model. All three lines show evaluations of the same forecasting models in
changing samples.
In Appendix E we show additional results. We show that our forecast model is also able
to predict one-quarter and one-year ahead with very similar AUC. The year-ahead model, in
particular, performs extremely well with an AUC of 0.96 and 0.73 in hard cases which implies
the model can provide useful early warning even for outbreaks that are occur far into the future.
We also show that model performance is not specific to 30 topics. The model performs similarly
well for 7, 15, and 30 topics. We also explore the role of the forecast algorithm and show that
random forests perform best. In the next section we turn towards the role of the random forests
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in explaining the ability of our methodology to pick up signals for hard problem cases.
An important question is how much improvement is possible by adding more variables to
our framework. We have experimented extensively but have not managed to improve the model
in a robust way. To illustrate the surprising performance of text, we compare the predictive
power to two sets of predictors from the economics and forecasting literature. The first is a
standard set of predictors based on Goldstone et al. (2010) which includes political institution
dummies based on various dimensions of the Polity IV data, number of neighboring conflicts
from UCDP, and data on child mortality from the World Bank. In the second case, we use a
dataset of 60 commodity prices which we combine with commodity export weights from Bazzi
and Blattman (2014) to generate a measure for commodity income shocks. These are updated
on a monthly basis by the World Bank and could therefore provide a good basis for forecasts.19
Moreover, we add a commodity index by extracting the first factor of all the commodity prices.
Many commodity export weights and standard variables such as infant mortality are not avail-
able for as many countries and years. For the sake of comparability, we therefore only use
overlapping predictions for evaluation, i.e. country-months in which the availability of data
allow predictions for both sets of variables.
We find that both the standard variables and commodity prices contain some forecasting
power but that the forecast of all cases from conflict history alone is much better.20 Most im-
portantly, a model based on history and text together with other variables does not consistently
perform better than our main model based on history and text alone. Adding variables to the
history & text model does not add forecasting power but comes at the price of reducing the
sample and speed of updates.21 This is surprising given the huge attention paid to variation in
commodity prices in the conflict literature. It highlights the complementarity of work on causal
19We fix the weights following Ciccone (2018) who finds a much stronger impact of commodity-price shocks
on conflict using fixed weights.
20Results and a comparison to these models are shown in Appendix Figures E.3 and E.4.
21Many standard variables are available only for a subset of countries and with lags up to several years. It is
even more problematic that many macro variables get re-coded over time which means some of the variables in
the standard model use future information.
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effects which tries to understand the drivers of conflict and work on forecasting conflict which
provides a very different focus on variables with high explanatory power.
4.2 How Machine Learning Solves the Hard Problem
What explains the good forecast performance of our methodology? A key advantage is that
topics allow us to exploit the entire variation in the news text. An important advantage of this
is that we can rely on positive and negative associations of topics and risk. In Figure 5 we show
the average share of each of the 30 topics in months before an onset relative to months in which
there is no onset. On the x-axis we show the relative topic share before hard cases and on the
y-axis we show the relative share for all cases. For instance, the terror topic is much more likely
to appear before hard and all onsets relative to a peaceful month. On the x-axis we see that
newspapers write almost twice as much on terror than in other months before the outbreak of a
hard onset. The religion topic appears before hard cases but is not strongly associated with all
onsets. Other topics related to the economy, trade, transport and international relations appear
less before onsets.22 In this way, the topics provide signals which the supervised learning is
able to exploit.
The random forest builds a forecast model from these text features and the conflict history
variables. How does the random forest manage to exploit the variation shown in Figure 5 while
at the same time allowing conflict history to play a central role? A random forest is a bootstrap
aggregating (bagging) model which aggregates predicted decisions of many decision trees. A
decision tree is a structure where at each node a decision is made given a cutoff value of a
predictor. A random forest in the case of a binary variable then averages the share of 1s in the
final nodes across all trees, and therefore predicts a probability, ŷiT+1. The randomness comes
about by bootstrapping the sample from one tree to the next which avoids overfitting to the data.
See, for example, a decision tree in Figure 6 where for the sake of exhibition we choose
22These changes are statistically significant and many hold even when we control for country fixed effects.
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Note: Each dot represents the average appearance of a topic across country/months relative to peaceful months.
The x-axis represents the relative appearance in months preceding hard onsets while the y-axis shows the relative
appearance in months before onsets in countries with a conflict history.
a tree depth of three. Each node presents the variable and the associated value chosen for the
split, how many cases reach the respective node or leaf, and what case distribution of outbreaks
is at the node or leaf. The algorithm settles on the international relations topic stock at the top
of the tree and decides to split at the value 0.099. This choice of variable and the corresponding
split is determined based on the gains in terms of reducing Gini impurity, i.e. a reduction in
entropy.23
While at the outset the probability of an onset is 3.8% (≈ 211256005 ), after the split it is about
1.9% if the condition is false and 4.1% if the condition is true, i.e. cases with a low international
relations topic stock have a higher probability of an onset. The rest of the example tree follows
23Gini impurity can be understood as the likelihood of an incorrect classification of a case if that case were
randomly classified according to the overall distribution. Basically, a maximum Gini impurity means that half of
the cases face an onset with a probability of 1, whereas the other half with probability 0. A low Gini impurity
indicates that shares of cases are very imbalanced. For instance, if I know that amongst the remaining 100 cases 1
will have an outbreak with probability 0 and 99 with probability 1, then by randomly predicting a probability of 1
would lead to an accurate classification. See Appendix C.1 for more details.
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the same logic until we reach the leafs, i.e. the terminal nodes. As a result of these classifications
each case receives a probability according to the distribution in the leaf. Then this probability
is averaged across all trees, which in our model using text & history are 400 trees with a depth
of 8. Appendix Figure C.1 presents an example tree of depth 8 to illustrate the complexity that
the forecast model reaches.24
Fig. 6: Simplified example tree of depth 3
Note: Decision tree of depth tree. Each node specifies the chosen predictor and the corresponding cutoff. If the
condition is fulfilled one moves down the left branch, if not down the right. The nodes and leafs further specify
the number of cases that reach that node and the distribution across non outbreaks and outbreaks.
A way of gauging the importance of variables to the predictive performance is by looking
at which position of the tree the predictor is chosen how often. Typically, a predictor chosen
at the top of a tree contributes more to discriminating between cases than one chosen towards
the bottom (or not at all). In Figure 7 we present the frequency of the positions at which each
predictor is chosen.25 We find that the predictors which contribute most to the reduction in
Gini impurity, are also the ones that are most likely to be chosen towards the top of the tree.
For example, the predictor indicating the months since the last conflict receives the largest
importance score and is more often used in top nodes of the tree.
Topics, even those that are almost never chosen in the higher branches of the tree, are often
used in lower branches. In other words, the random forest model is automatically geared to-
wards picking up more subtle risks with topics when conflict history is absent. In this way the
24In Appendix Figure C.2 we present the feature importance of each predictor, which is the average contribution
of a predictor to the reduction in Gini impurity.
25In Appendix Figure C.3 we present the relative frequencies.
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forecasting model works around the importance of the conflict trap by conditioning on conflict
history and at the same time uses information contained in the text displayed in Figure 5. A
subtle aspect of this process is that the model uses topics to capture stabilizations in countries
with a conflict history. News on the economy, for example, vary dramatically across countries
and time. In stabilizing countries these and similar news stories on trade or finance appear more
and more and this information is used in lower branches to indicate low risk.26 The random
forest can therefore use the text features to drive down the false positive rate.
Fig. 7: Frequency each predictor is chosen at each depth of tree across forest




Middle East topic share
Middle East topic stock
Economics topic share
Economics topic stock
Current events topic share
Current events topic stock
Industry topic share
Industry topic stock
Nuclear treaties topic share











Peace agreements topic share
Peace agreements topic stock
Daily life topic share
Daily life topic stock
State visits topic share
State visits topic stock
Health topic share
Health topic stock
International relations topic share





Middle East II topic share









South America topic share







Political power topic share






Months since last battle death
Months since 50 battle deaths














Note: The x-axis displays the depth of the tree and y-axis the predictors. The darker the shade of a cell, the more
often the respective predictor is chosen at this depth. The legend on the right indicates the log(frequency+1)
represented by the shade.
A random forest does not provide parameters of coefficients with familiar signs, magnitudes,
or significance levels. However, they allow a fine-grained way of plotting the contribution
of each predictor, and whether the variable increases or decreases the predicted likelihood of
an outbreak in a SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) beeswarm plots. SHAP values are
26Examples are provided in Appendix Figure B.1.
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based on the idea of the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), i.e., the average marginal contribution
across all permutations, and were adapted for the evaluation of predictors in machine-learning
applications by Lundberg and Lee (2017). The SHAP value captures the impact of having a
certain value for a given predictor in comparison to the prediction made if that predictor took
the mean value. That is, the SHAP values of all predictors sum up to explain why a prediction
is different from the baseline.
Figure 8 shows the SHAP value for each observation at the country-month level. On the
y-axis it shows the 18 top predictors in terms of predictive performance sorted by their average
contribution to the forecast. Variables with relatively high values are exhibited in red, while
those taking relatively low values are blue. Finally, the horizontal location displays whether
the effect of that value caused a higher (right) or lower (left) prediction. Therefore, if the blue
dots are on the left and the red dots are on the right, then the variable is positively related to the
onset of conflict, while the reverse indicates a negative association. The starker the separation
of the two, the less controversial the sign. The wider the spread, the greater the magnitude.
We see that the variables capturing how many months have passed since the last conflict are
the most important predictors, followed by the terror topic. The topics contributing most of
the predictive power are a mix of topics related to violence (e.g. military), regional topics (e.g.
China), and activity (e.g. trade). While the majority of topics are positively associated with the
onset of violence, others are not (e.g. the China and the transport topic). In Appendix Figure C.4
we present a breakdown of the SHAP values depending on how much time has passed since
conflict for the topic covering peace agreements. We see that the extent too which this topic is
related to the outbreak of violence depends on how much time has elapsed since the last fatality,
exemplifying why a random forest, which effectively builds interactions into its prediction, is
particularly useful for this purpose.
A key insight from this analysis is that the random forest can use the news text features to
produce something like a contextual awareness which is obvious to human observers but hard to
25
Fig. 8: SHAP beeswarm plots of predictors
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Note: The vertical location indicates the ranked average importance of the 18 most important predictors with the
predictor with highest mean absolute SHAP value at the top. Each dot represents a case, i.e. a country-month. A
red (blue) dot indicates that the predictor takes a relatively high (low) value for the case. The horizontal location
shows whether the effect of that value caused a higher or lower prediction.
quantify objectively. Peace agreements seem, for example, highly indicative of risk which could
be because peace agreements are only necessary in situations in which severe armed conflicts
have come to an end but where renewed outbreaks are likely.
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5 Integrating Forecasting and Prevention
5.1 A Prevention Cost Function
Building on the findings in the standard forecast framework we now derive a way to interpret
the model output ŷiT+1 for the prevention problem. We propose the simplest possible, static
framework that would allow a policymaker to derive an optimal cutoff cΘ∗. Our framework as-
sumes a policy rule by which prevention interventions are taken for risk values above a threshold
ŷiT+1 > cΘ∗. However, actions are taken under uncertainty regarding the realizations of conflict
outbreaks which means that interventions cause a cost regardless of whether the forecast was
correct or not. This imposes a cost of false positives.
At the same time we assume that interventions do not always work even if they are im-
plemented in a situation with an impeding conflict onset. This allows us to illustrate how the
prediction problem interacts with the much larger literature on causal drivers of armed conflict.
Research on causal effects allows policymakers to implement the correct policies in situations
which are in danger of escalating into conflict, good forecasts save costs because they allow the
policymaker target these situations better.
Assume that the policymaker wants to minimize expected total costs by choosing a forecast
cutoff c, i.e. she is facing the following problem
min
c
E[Costc] = CostT P×E[T Pc]+CostFP×E[FPc] (2)
+CostFN×E[FNc]+CostT N×E[T Nc]
where CostJ with J ∈ {T P,FP,T N,FN} are the different cost weights on the cost function
and E[T Pc], for example, is the expected number of true positives at cutoff c. Note, that this
cost function is shared by many policy problems like preventing an economic crisis, crime or
an epidemic wave. To simplify, we provide a static framework but the cost function could
be adapted to a dynamic decision problem in which a policymaker takes repeated preventive
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actions over time. We now make additional assumptions to simplify and adapt this general
form of the cost function to the policy problem to give a little more interpretative quality to the
cost weights.
We first assume that the past out-of-sample performance of the forecast model can serve as
a benchmark of its future performance, i.e. that E[T Pc] = T Pc in the forecast model. This is
only realistic if the existence of the forecast or the presence of the policymaker do not change
the performance of the forecast itself. We will return to this point and other caveats in the
concluding section.
The objective of the policymaker is to minimize the costs of conflict and interventions. In
this context false negatives, FNc, mean conflicts break out and cause present discounted damage
VD. The discounted future cost of peace today is VP which is the cost weight of true negatives
T Nc.
Call I the cost per intervention, i.e. per predicted positive. This cost needs to be paid regard-
less of whether the intervention is successful and therefore generates a cost of false positives,
FPc. In the case of a true positive, T Pc, the policymaker intervenes in a situation in which a
conflict would otherwise break out for sure. In other words, the intervention will try to convert
a true positive into a peaceful outcome. We assume for simplicity that prevention works with
some constant likelihood p. This is where research on causal mechanisms is relevant because
it should lead to better policies and an increase in the likelihood p. This highlights the comple-
mentarity between research on causal links and the forecasting problem stressed by Kleinberg
et al. (2015).
With these assumptions the cost function in equation (2) can then be rewritten:
mincE[Costc] = (pVP +(1− p)VD + I)×T Pc +(VP + I)×FPc (3)
+VD×FNc +VP×T Nc.
Lowering the cutoff c will put more weight on the first line of the cost function. As I > 0 we
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therefore need that
pVP +(1− p)VD + I <VD
or
I < p(VD−VP)
for there to be any use in preventive action. This is intuitive as prevention today costs I and
leads to an expected benefit of p(VD−VP).
Note, how the framework integrates the forecasting problem into the existing literature on
the causes of conflict. The forecast is used to flag some cases as positives (likely outbreaks)
and others as negatives (likely peace). A positive triggers an intervention which needs to be
designed based on research on the causes of conflict. The better the research on causes, the
higher will be p. The forecast framework also plays an important but more subtle role here.
This is best illustrated with the cutoff c above which the forecast framework declares a situation
a positive and triggers an intervention. A decrease in the cutoff c generates more positives and
less negatives. In equation 3 this will lower the number of FNc and T Nc and at the same time
increase both T Pc and FPc. If the forecast is very good it will identify cases which were a
FNc and covert them into T Pc (anticipated outbreaks). This conversion generates a benefit of
p(VD−VP)− I. But the lower the cutoff the more errors will the forecast make. This means
it will convert more and more T Nc into FPc (false warnings) which increases costs by I. As
observations are ordered by the fitted values, ŷT+1, performance is first high and then falls so
that the problem is well-behaved. We will show this now.
5.2 The Optimal Intervention Threshold
As an illustration of this integrated prevention framework, we now assume some, relatively
conservative, parameters and plot the resulting cost curves to derive the cutoff that minimizes
total expected costs in Equation (3).
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Assume that the outbreak of a conflict leads to total discounted costs of 100 billion USD
and that the discounted cost of peace is normalized to 0 USD.27 Good estimates of prevention
costs and effectiveness are hard to come by - mostly because there is currently no quantitative
measurement of prevention efforts outside countries with a conflict history. A key cost factor is
whether military interventions are necessary so that we would expect interventions in countries
without a recent conflict to be much cheaper.28 We assume that prevention costs for all cases
are 1 billion USD per month of intervention. This is a high intervention cost per month and
we assume that this makes prevention effective in one out of four interventions (p = 0.25).
To illustrate the role of research on causes in this framework we also show what happens if
interventions are much less effective (p = 0.05). We do not assume that interventions are less
costly or more effective in hard problem cases.
We plug these values in to get the cost weights in Equation (3). 29 We then use our text
& history forecast to evaluate the number of true positives, false positives, true negatives and
false negatives at different cutoffs. The numbers together with the cost weights then give cost
values for a given cutoff when they are plugged into Equation (3). Figure 9 illustrates the
resulting cost function for effective and ineffective interventions. On the x-axis of the figure,
we show the cutoff c and on the y-axis we plot total costs. In order to benchmark the costs with
intervention, we also show the costs without any interventions as a red horizontal line. The cost
function (blue line) will always converge towards this benchmark with higher cutoffs as less
and less interventions are conducted.
In the left panel of Figure 9 we show the outcome with relatively effective interventions
27The World Bank estimated, for example, that from 2011 until the end of 2016, the cumulative losses in GDP
from the Syrian civil war were 226 USD billion (World Bank 2017a). This is obviously just a small share of the
total costs which includes also the costs of the humanitarian response. In the actual application this number could
also depend on population size and many other factors.
28See the discussion in Chalmers (2007).
29We then have that true positives cost pVP + (1− p)VD + I = 76 billion USD with effective interventions
(p = 0.25) and 96 billion USD with ineffective interventions (p = 0.05). False positives cost the intervention
costs, 1 billion USD. The most costly outcome are false negatives with 100 billion USD and the least costly
outcome are true negatives with 0 costs.
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(p = 0.25). For low cutoffs there are a lot of interventions and this generates plenty of false
positives and costs which are higher than without interventions. With higher cutoffs the number
of interventions falls and with it total costs. At a cutoff of c = 0.047 the cost curve takes a
minimum. At this point, an increase in the cutoff increases total costs because precision now is
so high that the cases with interventions cover a lot of actual outbreaks so that raising the cutoff
creates many costly false negatives.
In the right panel of Figure 9 we show the same cost curves under the assumption that in-
terventions are less effective (p = 0.05). Note that the total costs without interventions remains
the same. However, total costs with interventions are now much higher so that cost savings with
prevention are lower.30 With ineffective interventions the required precision needs to be higher,
the number of interventions needs to fall and the optimal cutoff therefore increases to a value
which is now closer to c = 0.2.
This trade-off between policy effectiveness and the intervention cutoff is a special feature
of the framework we propose here. Effectiveness p, a causal concept, influences the way the
policymaker interprets the forecasts coming out of the forecasting model. Less effective policy
tools make the policymaker more conservative in her forecast. The usefulness of our forecast
model therefore critically depends on whether conflicts can be de-escalated and at which costs.
But the reverse is also true; optimal intervention policy will react to the precision of the fore-
cast. Conflicts break out after only 3% of all peaceful months. Without targeting, prevention
therefore produces 33 times more false positives, FPc, than true positives, T Pc, and this ratio
becomes much worse in cases without a recent conflict history. This can prohibit even cheap,
effective interventions.
In our example, the likelihood of an onset after an intervention is 16% and the cost func-
tions indicate that this makes prevention efforts cost effective. In the Appendix we show how
interventions would have been allocated across time if our simple prevention framework had
30Cost savings compared to no intervention are 1 trillion USD with ineffective interventions and 13 trillion USD
with effective interventions.
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Note: Cost curves are calculated from the sample 2005m1-2020m8. The figure contrasts two scenarios for
preventive interventions using equation (3) and the out-of-sample forecast information of the text & history
history model. The left cost curve assumes interventions are relatively effective (p = 0.25) and the right figure
assumes interventions are relatively ineffective (p = 0.05). Intervention costs are 1 billion USD and if an
outbreak is prevented this saves damages of 100 billion USD.
been used in the past. The assumptions we make would have led to about 25 interventions each
month with effective interventions and around 10 when we assume ineffective interventions.
When we assume effective interventions we get hundreds of interventions before outbreaks
without a recent conflict history. Thus, despite the low baseline risk, prevention would still
have been economically feasible under our assumptions.
5.3 Case Studies
Given the dynamic movements of estimated risk within countries reflect actual onset risk, it
makes sense to treat our risk estimates as data to be analyzed. We illustrate the nature of the
risk forecast based on the text model for four countries in Figures 10 and 11 and put our risk
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estimates in a relationship with the optimal cutoff derived in the previous section. The red lines
report the risk from the forecast model. The forecast is always one month ahead so that the
value for 2015m4, for example, is for an outbreak in 2015m5. We show the optimal intervention
cutoff as a dashed black line.
Figure 10 shows the cases of Lesotho and Belarus. Both of these countries represent failures
in the sense that Lesotho did not have a violent onset in 2014 according to UCDP, whereas Be-
larus had an onset in 2020 which was not anticipated. However, the figures are still meaningful
in that they show the variation of risk that is triggered by a deep political crisis in Lesotho in
2014, including gunshots being fired on 30 August in what was coined a coup attempt. Our
forecast model clearly picks this up in an episode of heightened risk which stretches out for
quite a long time. The case of Belarus represents a false negative as the UCDP codes armed
conflict for August 2020 which our model did not anticipate. This is reflected in a dramatic
increase of risk as Belarus now has a recent conflict history.
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Note: Predictors include 30 topics, token counts and three conflict history variables. The intervention threshold is
taken from Figure 9.
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Figure 11 shows the cases of Tunisia and Cameroon. Both of these countries represent par-
tial successes in the sense that conflict risk crosses the intervention threshold for a long period
before political violence actually broke out according to UCDP. Whereas these are not correct
anticipations of conflict onsets a month before the outbreak, this suggests that if preventive ef-
forts have long-term effects it might have helped prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in these
countries.
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Note: Predictors include 30 topics, token counts and three conflict history variables. The intervention threshold is
taken from Figure 9.
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6 Conclusion
The prevention of conflict requires attention to cases with a low baseline risk, i.e. cases in which
the country is experiencing a sudden destabilization after long periods of peace. Research can
help here by providing forecasting models which are able to pick up subtle changes in risk. We
contribute to this agenda by providing a forecasting model which combines unsupervised and
supervised machine learning to pick up subtle conflict risks in large amounts of news text. This
allows us to forecast cases which would otherwise remain undetected and, at the same time,
overcomes the problem of lack of good and timely published data which is a crucial problem in
applications.
Our results paint a positive picture of the role of supervised learning in longer time series.
The optimal tree depth is quite deep and there is some reliance on text despite the first-order
importance of conflict dynamics. This suggests that the dimensionality reduction with LDA
helps to reveal deep, underlying features which are recognized when enough data is available.
Yet, dimensionality reduction using unsupervised learning is rarely used in conflict forecasting.
Applying unsupervised learning to the large amounts of available event data seems a particularly
useful way forward for problems with a restricted number of training cases.
Forecasting models like ours also provide objective risk evaluations for countries which
never experienced the outbreak of armed conflict. This is not only potentially useful for policy-
makers but it has the advantage of providing the basis for research on prevention itself. Here is
where we see considerable potential for future research. The fact that some conflicts are harder
to forecast than others might also yield insights into the role of exogenous factors like economic
shocks and endogenous internal political factors.
Our second contribution is the interpretation of the forecast in a policy framework which
would allow a policymaker to analyze trade-offs between intervention effectiveness and forecast
performance. We show that under reasonable parameter assumptions that a policymaker might
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want to use our forecasts to engage in preventive action. However, the framework also reveals
strong pressures to focus on a reaction to recent violence as it is currently the case the real
world. We believe such insights to be of use far beyond the prediction of conflict.
However, there are several caveats in our current framework which are fruitful areas for
future research. First, our intervention model is static which means it does not take into account
the fact that the policymaker will also intervene in the future which would, in turn, change the
costs and expected damages today. Second, we assumed that risks do not react to the forecast or
the prospects of intervention. If forecasts are made public they may, however, have an impact on
conflict risk by changing beliefs of local or global actors. In this regard our policy regime might
face its own Lucas critique or constitute self-fulfilling prophecies. In this case the publication
of the forecast would render it wrong.
Appendix
A Data Description
All our text data is downloaded manually from LexisNexis and Latin News. Due to copyright
issues the raw newspaper articles cannot be shared. Summarized topics and all other data and
codes will be made available upon publication. The key factor in choosing our news sources
is that they should be english-speaking, offer as much text as possible and long time series.
We therefore chose the New York Times (NYT), the Washington Post (WP), the Economist,
Latin News, and the BBC Monitor (BBC). The latter source represents the bulk of our data
and tracks broadcasts, press and social media sources in multiple languages from over 150
countries worldwide and produces translations in English. Latin News is a news aggregator
and commentator that specializes on countries in Latin America. We chose this source as the
BBC Monitor has a geographic focus on Asia and Africa and we wanted to get a better signal
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for Latin America. A potential problem with our approach of mixing different sources with
different weights of economics and politics is that measurement error increases. However, we
see continuous monthly coverage of smaller countries as crucial.
We download an article if the name of the country or its capital appears in the title of the
article. This gives us a monthly panel of articles from all sources for over 190 countries for
the period 1989 to 2020. In total we have 4,258,192 articles of which 413,918 articles are from
the New York Times, 203,249 from the Washington Post, 41,607 from Latin News, 203,436
from the Economist, and 3,478,592 articles from the BBC Monitor. This means that the BBC
Monitor articles dominate our data. Figure A.1 shows the number of articles we have for each
quarter. From this is clear that the number of BBC news available from LexisNexis increases
around 2000. Part of this increase came from a change in the headlines, which around this
period often began with the country name followed by a colon and then a traditional headline.
This temporary change does not affect the regional distribution substantially. In any case, the
increase in the amount of news would be most problematic for our forecasting exercise if the
increase or decrease in the number of articles somehow affects the share of news written on a
specific topic, which does not appear to be the case.
In Table A.1 we summarize the different sets of predictors we use. The first model is based
on our text data. This includes 7, 15, or 30 topic shares and the log of the word count of that
month. The word count varies between 5 and 1226371 and is log-normally distributed with a
mean of 4274 words, while the topics sum to one within each country-month.
B Discussion of Estimated Topics
In this section we discuss various aspects of the estimated topics. We estimate the topic model
repeatedly starting with all text until 2005m1 and then we update every month using a dynamic
topic model (Řehůřek and Sojka 2010). We allow the weight variational hyperparameters for
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Note: The y-axis on the left exhibits the quartlerly sum of BBC articles, while the y-axis on the right exhibits the
quartlerly sum of articles from The Economist, New York Times, Washington Post, and Latin News.
each document to be inferred by the algorithm. Before feeding the text to the machine learning
algorithm we conduct standard procedures when working with text. We remove overly frequent
words defined as stopwords. Then we stem and lemmatize the words before also forming two
and three word combinations. Next we remove overly frequent tokens, i.e. those appearing in
at least half of the articles. Finally, we also remove rare expressions appearing in less than 200
documents. Table B.1 summarizes the top 10 terms in the K = 30 topic model estimated in
2020m8. The striking feature of the topic model is, that it provides an overview over the entire
news landscape with topics capturing peace talks, trade and development, politics and business.
This allows our forecast to rely on much more the presence or absence of conflict topics.
In Figure B.1 we show the timeline for two topics, terror and economics, in our sample
period for Brazil, Angola, Iraq and Ukraine. Two features are remarkable. First, as expected,
news on economics disappear rapidly as news on violence surge. Brazil, a country which was
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Table A.1: Sets of credictors
Name Variables
Topics Estimated topic shares and stocks using dynamic topic model and total
number of tokens
Conflict history Months since last fatality, since last occurrence of 50 fatalities,
and since last occurrence of 500 fatalities
Standard Infant mortality, political institutions, share of discriminated population,
and neighboring conflicts based largely on Goldstone et al. (2010)
Commodities 60 commodity prices with constant commodity export weights based largely
on Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and extracted first factor of all export weights
characterized by a lot of news on economics in particularly remarkable in this regard. In Angola
writing on violence decreases dramatically following the cease-fire in 2002. However, what
is even more remarkable is that economics news come in only slowly after a few years and
fluctuate significantly. We know that the forecasting model relies to a large extent on variation
like this - especially in its forecast of hard onsets. In Iraq the invasion of 2003 is very clearly
visible and Iraq is clearly depicted as an extremely violent place in the news. In addition,
economics is almost never discussed in Iraq. In Ukraine the start of the turmoil in 2014 and
outright war later stand out. Of course, such movements in conflict topics are only helpful for
forecasting if they anticipate conflict.
The topic model is also fine grained enough to pick up on specific events in developed
countries. In Figure B.2 we show the politics topic share in the UK (top) and the US (bottom).
Spikes are clearly visible around general elections. In the UK one can even tell when the
Scottish independence and the Brexit referendum took place, and for the case of Brexit there is
also a clear spike in the month it was announced.
Finally, in Figure B.3 we exhibit an example of how the topic model adapts to new situations.
The left panel shows the word cloud of the health topic with the text up until January 2020,
featuring expressions such as “medic”, “doctor”, and “hospit” prominently. On the right we
present the same topic in April where we can see that due to the Covid19 pandemic expressions
such as “outbreak”, “virus”, “pandem”, and “quarantin” have become more dominant. This
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exemplifies how the topic model can absorb a new situation by categorizing in a manner which
appears intuitive to a human.
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Fig. B.3: Health topic over time
a) 2020m1 b) 2020m4
Note: The word clouds represent the most likely terms of one of the 30 topics estimated using all text until
2020m1 (left) and 2020m4 (left). The size of a token is proportional to the importance of the token within the
topic. The location conveys no information.
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Table B.1: Top ten keywords of 30 topic model using all text until 2020m8
Nr Label Keywords
1 court, case, investig, polic, arrest, offic, prison, charg, justic, prosecutor
2 lebanes, annex, prime, arab, hezbollah, occupi, say, territori, plan, bank
3 cent, increas, rate, econom, economi, worker, price, percent, number, product
4 situat, time, issu, need, import, possibl, polit, say, decis, posit
5 compani, oil, product, gas, industri, energi, suppli, technolog, firm, oper
6 sanction, nuclear, missil, weapon, secur_council, secur, intern, deal, launch, agreement
7 militari, forc, defenc, armi, arm, troop, command, oper, arm_forc, secur
8 citi, local, water, region, area, district, project, resid, mayor, flood
9 offici, secur, administr, week, intellig, washington, hous, nation_secur, foreign, white
10 websit, region, head, quot, channel, jul, republ, rossiya, jun, territori
11 flight, air, ship, sea, airport, plane, aircraft, passeng, airlin, port
12 peac, agreement, secur, talk, intern, region, process, support, polit, statement
13 like, time, work, famili, home, woman, life, open, way, citi
14 foreign, ministri, meet, visit, offici, foreign_ministri, affair, prime, diplomat, issu
15 health, case, pandem, test, virus, infect, hospit, medic, patient, death
16 cooper, develop, relat, region, econom, support, intern, project, import, secur
17 parti, elect, polit, opposit, vote, ial, candid, leader, democrat, support
18 islam, majli, mosqu, religi, god, muslim, leader, offici, prayer, republ
19 say, region, statement, base, uae, moham, arab, pro, quot, support
20 protest, right, human, law, human_right, social, polic, activist, facebook, freedom
21 bank, dollar, fund, financi, money, financ, busi, debt, loan, budget
22 committe, council, member, meet, parliament, law, ministri, deputi, administr, feder
23 beij, parti, communist, citi, communist_parti, mainland, offici, wuhan, central, global
24 los, migrant, refuge, moral, lopez, juan, repatri, social, announc, crisi
25 attack, kill, polic, group, forc, secur, provinc, area, milit, local
26 medium, newspap, approxim, onlin, channel, video, page, daili, publish, say
27 trade, agreement, deal, sign, econom, export, busi, good, myanmar, tariff
28 like, power, say, time, way, war, make, polit, long, chang
29 word, daili, languag, taliban, prime, chief, issu, parti, languag_daili, sindh
30 border, minsk, cross, church, region, citizen, correspond, servic, resid, visa
Note: The labels are arbitrary and have no influence on the prediction model.
42
C Prediction Algorithms
To explore the gains from supervised learning we look at five different algorithms specified in
Table C.1 which are trained with the available data using a Python implementation (Pedregosa
et al. 2011). We standardize the data in order to improve the performance of machine learning
algorithms such as neural networks.
Table C.1: Models
Technique Brief description
Logit lasso Linear estimation of log-odds using lasso regularization
K-nearest neighbor Classifies a vector according to similarity
Neural network Artificial neurons split into layers including feedback effects
AdaBoost Weighted sum of other learning algorithm (‘weak learner’)
Random forest Average over many decision trees
The five individual supervised prediction algorithms we use are a logistic lasso regression,
k-nearest neighbor (kNN), neural network, AddaBoost, and random forest. Providing very
brief summaries, the logit lasso estimates the log odds of an event using a linear expression
while choosing which variables to include through a penalizing term. kNN is a non-parametric
method used for classification in which the algorithm classifies a vector according to similarity.
If a vector of predictors looks similar to those with many onsets, then it is more likely to classify
a given set of predictors as an onset. Neural networks are a complex web of artificial neurons
split into layers which are meant to resemble the functioning of neurons in a brain. Thereby,
the technique can capture non-linearities through feedback effects between the multiple layers
and because neurons might not fire until reaching a threshold. AdaBoost, which is short for
Adaptive Boosting, uses output of other learning algorithms, referred to as ‘weak learners’,
aggregated as a weighted sum. In our case, the weak learner is chosen to be a decision tree
of depth one. AdaBoost is adaptive in the sense that weak learners are tweaked in favor of
instances misclassified by previous classifiers.




Predictors Depth Trees split leaf
Text 7 600 18 6
Conflict history 7 200 18 6
Text & conflict history 8 400 6 6
Note: Hyperparameters chosen through cross-validation
within the sample before year 2005.
predictions of the entire collection of trees, i.e. the forest. This way of modeling risk has the
particular appeal that important features like conflict history will be chosen early if available,
and the model therefore adapts automatically to the hard problem. We discuss this feature in
the main text.
While the final evaluation of our model is carried out strictly out-of-sample, i.e. in the future
without using any contemporaneous or future information, the training of the models is per-
formed through cross-validation. More specifically, the method used is k-fold cross-validation,
where the training set is split into k smaller sets. For each of the k ‘folds’ the following pro-
cedure is performed: A model is trained using k− 1 of the folds as training data; using the
remaining data a test is carried out by computing our chosen performance measure, the AUC.
The performance measure reported by k-fold cross-validation is then the average of the values
computed in the loop. Each individual algorithm also requires the specification of hyperparam-
eters by the user. For each set of predictors, we choose these hyperparameters by doing a grid
search using the sample until the year 2005 and then selecting the hyperparameters that gener-
ate the highest AUC. Note, that this will understate the performance of the forecasting model
slightly if more information leads to a deeper or modified model in later years.
In Table C.2 we present the chosen hyperparameters for the random forest. We see that with




Imagine we have data of C classes and p(i) is the probability of picking class i. Then the Gini






For the time being imagine we have green and blue balls, so C = 2 and p(1) = p(2) = 0.5, i.e.
there is an equal amount of green and blue balls. In this case G= 0.5∗0.5+0.5∗0.5= 0.5. Next
imagine we are able to split the data in a way that we are left with p(1) = 0.8 and p(2) = 0.2.
Then G = 0.8∗0.2+0.2∗0.8 = 0.32, i.e. a reduction in Gini impurity of 0.18. When a random
forest is looking to split at a given node, it looks to choose the split leading to the maximum
reduction in Gini impurity. If we are left with only balls of one color, then the Gini impurity is
0.
Now in our exercise we down have green and blue balls, but outbreaks of conflicts. See
Figure 6 for a fictitious example tree and Figure C.1 for an actual tree out of the random forest
we use.































































Fig. C.2: Feature importance of predictors
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Impurity importance
Note: The bars indicate how much each predictor contributes to the overall reduction in Gini impurity.
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Fig. C.3: Relative frequency each predictor is chosen at each depth of tree across forest
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Note: The x-axis displays the depth of the tree and y-axis the predictors. The darker the shade of red (blue) the
shade of a cell, the more (less) frequent the corresponding predictor was chosen at this depth relative to the mean
number of predictors at this depth. The legend on the right indicates the log(frequency/mean frequency)
represented by the shade. If a cell is white, the predictor was chosen with average frequency. If a cell is black, the
predictor was never chosen at this depth.
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Fig. C.4: SHAP values of all individual predictors depending on time since last battle death
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6



























Notes: The y-axis present the SHAP value for the variable specified on the x-axis. The color of each dot indicates the the number of months
that have passed since the last battle death. A blue dot indicates a short time period, while a red dot indicates a long time period as can be seen
in the legend on the right.
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D Using the Optimal Interventions Model
To illustrate the cost function approach we show what would have happened if these cost pa-
rameters had been used to intervene in the past. For this we first assume high effectiveness and
low effectiveness respectively and calculate the optimal cutoff for all cases of any violence. The
optimal cutoffs and resulting cost functions are displayed in the main text.
In Figure D.1 we then show the hypothetical distribution of onsets and interventions over
time if a policymaker had used the advice coming out of the model with the optimal cutoffs
derived under the assumption of effective intervention from Figure 9. The grey bars in the
figure indicate false positives, i.e. interventions without an onset. The white bars indicate false
negatives and the black bars true positives. Precision here can be grasped by comparing the
black bars to the grey bars. The true positive rate is given by comparing the white bars to the
black bars.
In Figure D.2 we show the optimal interventions over time when assuming ineffective inter-
ventions. The different policy prescriptions for effective and ineffective interventions becomes
immediately clear from a comparison between Figures D.1 and D.2. To minimize costs, the
policymaker would intervene before most onsets of conflict if she applied the model under the
assumption that interventions work 25% of the time. This would lead to over 20 interventions
in most months, i.e. a high level of activity. This high number of interventions implies that
only a few outbreaks of violence are not covered by an intervention. Remember, that these
are mostly interventions in post-conflict situations which is in line with the idea that there is a
strong incentive to intervene in a situation in which conflict risks are obvious.
Ineffective interventions would be used much less common, around 10 per month, and the
share of onsets that would be covered by intervention falls dramatically. Many onsets happen
without an intervention.
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2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
Time
Interventions Onsets Onsets with intervention
Note: The predictions underlying the figure are based on a model using 30 topic shares and stocks, token counts,
the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last
conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. The cutoff for interventions is chosen to minimize costs as displayed in
Figure 9. The grey bars indicate the number of false positives (interventions without onsets). The white bars
indicate false negatives (onsets without interventions) and the black bars true positives (onsets with
interventions).
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2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
Time
Interventions Onsets Onsets with intervention
Note: The predictions underlying the figure are based on a model using 30 topic shares and stocks, token counts,
the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last
conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. The cutoff for ineffective interventions is chosen to minimize costs as
displayed in Figure 9. The grey bars indicate the number of false positives (interventions without onsets). The




In the following section we show additional results.
For many applications in prevention a prediction of one year ahead is more desirable. In
Figures E.1 and E.2 we therefore provide evaluations of a prediction model that considers an
onset if conflict breaks out within any of the three or twelve following months, respectively. In
order not to count the same onset multiple times, in the evaluation of the models’ performance
we only keep the month of the first coded onset of each outbreak.
The predictive performance of the model remains strong. Forecasts of onset up to a quarter
and year ahead both produce an AUC of 0.93 and 0.96 for any violence, and topics still add
significant forecasting power for the hard cases.
Fig. E.1: ROC curves for predictions of onset within next quarter




















Text & history 0.93 [0.93,0.94]











Text & history 0.71 [0.61,0.80]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. Left and right
panels show alternative evaluations of the same forecasting model. The left ROC curves show all cases. Hard
cases are shown to the right. Hard cases are defined as not suffering fatalities in 10 years. . Hard cases are defined
as not having had conflict in 10 years. The numbers in the legends represent the respective area under curve with
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Fig. E.2: ROC curves for predictions of onset within next year




















Text & history 0.96 [0.95,0.97]











Text & history 0.71 [0.60,0.81]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. The left ROC
curves show all cases. Hard cases are shown to the right. Hard cases are defined as not suffering fatalities in 10
years. Hard cases are defined as not having had conflict in 10 years. The numbers in the legends represent the
respective area under curve with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
In Figures E.3 and E.4 we compare predictions using other variables typically used in the
literature. For the sake of comparison, we only look at overlapping samples. For a further
discussion of the variables and findings see Section 4 in the main text. Neither set of predictors
performs particularly well for hard cases and adding additional predictors to the text & history
model does not improve the performance either.
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Fig. E.3: ROC curves of forecasting any violence (left) and armed conflict (right) compared to
standard variables





















Text & standard & history 0.90 [0.89,0.91]












Text & standard & history 0.80 [0.70,0.89]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts, three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict month with at least
50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities, and ‘standard’ contains infant mortality,
political institutions, and neighboring conflicts. Hard cases are defined as not having had conflict in 10 years. The
numbers in the legends represent the respective area under curve with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in
square brackets.
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Fig. E.4: ROC curves of forecasting any violence (left) and armed conflict (right) compared to
commodity prices





















Text & commodities & history 0.88 [0.87,0.90]












Text & commodities & history 0.77 [0.64,0.87]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities, and ‘commodities’
contains 60 commodity export weights interacted with the monthly mean price for the commodity. Hard cases are
defined as not having had conflict in 10 years. The numbers in the legends represent the respective area under
curve with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
In Figures E.5 and E.6 we present compare the results of a model featuring 7 or 15 topics to
our benchmark model of 30 topics. While the model using 30 topics performs slightly better, it
also becomes clear that the predictive performance is not specific to summarizing the text into
30 topics.This strengthens that notion that text summarized into topics is a powerful predictor
of conflict.
In Figure E.7 we show results for higher cutoffs. The harder it is to predict conflict, the
more topics add to the forecasting power. In particular, when forecasting the hard cases of
any violence, the text-only model provides a relatively good forecast given the difficulty of
predicting these events. When predicting civil war, the presence of any violence or armed
conflict are powerful predictors, even in the hard cases, which is why it is difficult to augment
the prediction of further escalation even with text. However, one should note that text alone
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Fig. E.5: ROC curves of forecasting violence with varying number of topics using only text


















7 topics 0.82 [0.81,0.83]
15 Topics 0.84 [0.83,0.85]
30 topics 0.84 [0.83,0.85]









7 topics 0.78 [0.70,0.85]
15 Topics 0.79 [0.71,0.86]
30 topics 0.79 [0.70,0.86]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 7, 15, or 30 topic shares and stocks as well as
token counts. Hard cases are defined as not having had conflict in 10 years.
also achieves high levels of accuracy for all and the hard cases.
In Figure E.8 we show separation plots using topics and conflict history. The figures order
predictions by their rank on the x-axis and plot the predicted level of risk using the red dashed
line on the y-axis. The black vertical lines indicate actual onsets. Onsets tend to be bunched
on the right side of the panel where the predicted probabilities are highest. But separation plots
have the additional advantage of providing an idea of where the model fails to predict conflict.
The 10,000 lowest risk observations contain only 9 onsets without clear common features.
We show the performance of each of these individual prediction models using text only
(Figure E.9) and both text and conflict history (Figure E.10). Across most dimensions it seems
that the random forest is the algorithm performing best, which stands out particularly when
predicting the hard cases of any violence with conflict history and text. Here the random forest
reaches an AUC of 0.79 whereas the logit lasso only reaches and AUC of 0.74 using text only
and dropping to 0.64 with text & history. This is consistent with the idea that the random forest
receives an advantage because the model is able to use the information contained in the text con-
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Fig. E.6: ROC curves of forecasting violence with varying number of topics using text and
history


















7 topics 0.92 [0.91,0.93]
15 Topics 0.92 [0.91,0.93]
30 topics 0.92 [0.91,0.93]









7 topics 0.78 [0.73,0.84]
15 Topics 0.75 [0.67,0.83]
30 topics 0.79 [0.71,0.86]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 7, 15, or 30 topic shares and stocks as well as
token counts. Hard cases are defined as not having had conflict in 10 years.
ditional on conflict history. One exception is the AdaBoost model, i.e. adaptive boosting, which
also relies on decision trees and therefore is related to the random forest. The reason we do
not use the AdaBoost algorithm as the benchmark model is because of the predicted probabili-
ties, which albeit performing great in terms of ranking, are distributed largely between 0.4-0.5,
which is not only unrealistic, but also achieves a lower performance in terms of precision as can
be seen in Figure E.11.
All in all, the figures paint a consistent picture: Conflict history and is a very good predictor
of the outbreak of violence. Nonetheless, text summarized by topics adds useful information to
predict topics, in particular in countries without current violence or a conflict history.
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Fig. E.7: ROC curves of forecasting armed conflict with at least 50 battle deaths




















Text & history 0.96 [0.96,0.97]











Text & history 0.86 [0.77,0.94]
Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains four variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last conflict
month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities, and the most recent
number of fatalities. Hard cases are defined as not having had armed conflict in 10 years.
Fig. E.8: Separation plot of forecasting any violence using text and conflict history
a) Text

















b) Text & history

















Note: Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. The figures order
predictions by their rank on the x-axis and plot the predicted level of risk using the red dashed line on the y-axis.
The black vertical lines indicate actual onsets.
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Fig. E.9: ROC curves of forecasting violence with different algorithms using only text





































Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts. Hard cases are defined as not having had conflict in 10 years.
Fig. E.10: ROC curves of forecasting violence with different algorithms using text and history





































Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities. Hard cases are
defined as not having had conflict in 10 years.
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Fig. E.11: Precision curves of forecasting violence with different algorithms using text and
history
































Note: The prediction method is a random forest. ‘Text’ contains 30 topic shares and stocks as well as token
counts and ‘history’ contains three (four) variables: the time that has passed since the last conflict month, the last
conflict month with at least 50 fatalities, and the last conflict month with at least 500 fatalities (and the most
recent number of fatalities when predicting armed conflict).
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